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Abstract—Text-based password schemes have inherent security 
and usability problems, leading to the development of graphical 
password schemes.  However, most of these alternate schemes are 
vulnerable to spyware attacks. We propose a new scheme, using 
CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Public Turing tests to tell 
Computers and Humans Apart) that retaining the advantages of 
graphical password schemes, while simultaneously raising the 
cost of adversaries by orders of magnitude. Furthermore, some 
primary experiments are conducted and the results indicate that 
the usability should be improved in the future work. 
Keywords: graphical password; CAPTCHA; spyware; 
authentication 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A key area in security research and practice is 
authentication, the determination of whether a user should be 
allowed to access to a given system or resource. Generally, the 
most common and convenient authentication method is the 
traditional alphanumeric password. However, their inherent 
security and usability problems [6-11] led to the development 
of graphical passwords as an alternative. To date, there have 
been several graphical password schemes, such as [7, 18, 20-
26]. They have overcome some drawbacks of traditional 
password schemes, but most of the current graphical password 
schemes remain vulnerable to spyware attacks. 
Commonly, a spyware is a software that, from a user’s 
perspective, covertly gathers information about a computer’s 
use and relays that information back to a third party [1]. 
Spyware has gradually become one of the most common 
security threats to computer systems. Password collection by 
spywares has rapidly increased [4, 5, 12, 13, 15]. The research 
community has expended much effort [4, 16, 17, 18, 20, 26] on 
this topic. However, how to protect passwords effectively 
against spyware attack continues to be a problem. Observing 
that a practical spyware attack is done by an automated 
program, we propose a new approach where CAPTCHA is 
exploited. 
CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Public Turing tests to 
tell Computers and Humans Apart) is a program that generates 
and grades tests that are human solvable, but beyond the 
capabilities of current computer programs [27]. The robustness 
of CAPTCHA is found in its strength in resisting automatic 
adversarial attacks, automatic adversarial attacks, and it has 
many applications for practical security, including online polls, 
free email services, search engine bots, worms and spam, and 
preventing dictionary attacks [27]. Our proposal creates an 
innovative use of CAPTCHA in the context of graphical 
passwords to provide better password protection against 
spyware attacks. 
In this paper, we have proposed a new authentication 
scheme combining graphical passwords with text-based 
CAPTCHA. The scheme is easy for humans but makes it 
almost impossible for automated programs to harvest 
passwords. The novel scheme is friendly for legitimate users, 
while simultaneously raising the time and computer capacity 
cost to adversaries by several orders of magnitude. 
Experiments showed its effectiveness, but also indicated further 
research would improve its usability. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
briefly reviews related work. Sections 3 and 4 present our 
scheme and analyses its security. Section 6 provides the results 
of experiments described in section 5. Section 7 discusses 
additional observations and possible extension to our scheme. 
Conclusions and future work are addressed in section 8. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
Most current graphical password schemes, such as [7, 21, 
23, 24, 25], require users to enter the password directly, 
typically by clicking or drawing. Hence, passwords are easily 
exposed to a third party who has the opportunity to record a 
successful authentication session. There have been a few 
graphical password schemes devoted to secure passwords 
against spyware attacks. In the following, several 
representatives will be described. 
Man, et al [20] proposed that users remember a number of 
text strings as well as several images as pass-objects. To pass 
the authentication, users should enter the unique codes 
corresponding to the displayed pass-object variants and a code 
indicating the relative location of the pass-objects in reference 
to a pair of eyes. It is relatively hard to crack this kind of 
password, but the complex memory requirement is an obstacle 
to its popularity. 
In [26], users need to recognize pass-objects and click 
inside the convex hull formed by all of the pass-objects. If 
properly designed, this method can provide good security. 
However, from time to time the convex hull is either too small 
to click or too large, creating a guessing problem. Moreover, to 
provide a large password space may result in a crowed screen 
and indistinguishable objects. The method in [22] to resist 
shoulder-surfing is a trivial trick, where a user must click a 
group composed of both the pass-object and decoy-object 
rather than click the pass-objects directly. The prototype 
presented in [22] does not provide sufficient security, having 
only two objects in each group. 
In 2006, Weinshall proposed another challenge-response 
protocol that relied on a shared secret set of pictures [18]. To 
reduce the amount of information given out with each 
authentication session, the image set memberships are used to 
select a certain path on an image mosaic, with the user 
providing only a code that depends on the path’s endpoint. This 
scheme was claimed to be so strong that an observer who fully 
records any feasible series of successful interactions could not 
compute the user’s password. However, it was demonstrated by 
Golle and Wagner [19] that the attacker can learn a user’s 
secret key with a SAT solver after observing as few as six 
successful user logins. 
In essence, the above methods adopt a challenge-response 
protocol to confuse the spyware. They can prevent the 
passwords being cracked by the spyware and falling into the 
hand of an adversary, along with resisting replay attacks. 
Taking the previous mechanisms for reference, our scheme also 
uses a challenge-response protocol to enhance security. But, 
unlike these methods, our scheme innovatively applies 
CAPTCHA to graphical passwords to create a highly secure 
authentication method. 
Figure 1.  The interface of the basic scheme (The pass-images are circled).
III. OUR SCHEME 
Our approach is motivated by the observation that effective 
spyware attacks are launched from automated programs. We 
realized that to increase security passwords should be 
accompanied by a product of a “computation” that is difficult 
for machines. As an authentication method, the scheme should 
also be user friendly. Considering these requirements, we 
applied CAPTCHA to graphical password schemes. 
CAPTCHA is a program designed to test whether the user 
is a computer or a human, by creating a task easy for humans 
but difficult for machines [27]. It is based on hard AI problems 
which cannot be solved with any greater accuracy than what is 
currently known to the AI community [31]. CAPTCHA is now 
almost a standard security mechanism for addressing 
undesirable or malicious Internet bot programs [28] and major 
web sites such as Google, Yahoo and Microsoft all have their 
own CAPTCHAs. The state-of-the-art CAPTCHAs mainly 
include three types: text-based schemes, sound-based schemes 
and image-based schemes. The most widely deployed schemes 
are text-based CAPTCHAs and we also use this in our 
schemes. 
After introducing a basic scheme with a hidden safety 
loophole, we will describe an improved scheme that is 
designed to fill the hole. The performances of the both schemes 
depend extremely on the property of CAPTCHA. 
A. The Basic Scheme 
The basic scheme embeds a text-based CAPTCHA into a 
simple graphical password scheme. Each image has a 
CAPTCHA instance called adjunctive string and the strings are 
generated at random by the system. In the register phase, users 
are required to select and remember images as their password 
images (pass-images). To be authenticated, users need to 
distinguish his/her pass-images as well as solve a test by 
recognizing and typing the adjunctive string below each pass-
image. For example, in Figure 1, assume the three images with 
red circles are pass-images, users should input the adjunctive 
strings ‘mewo’, ‘xnco’ and ‘nvso’ correctly to pass the 
authentication. 
For simplicity, we assume that the CAPTCHA here is an 
ideal CAPTCHA that is hard enough for machines to recognize 
while easy for humans to solve. 
In the case that adversaries are automated programs without 
human intervention, the scheme has a strong resistance to 
replay attack. Namely, even if it observes a successful login, a 
spyware program cannot launch a replay attack. This can be 
illustrated from two aspects. Firstly, pass-images are entered by 
typing random adjunctive strings rather than clicking directly. 
In other words, the entered strings are the trap instead of the 
real password. Secondly, machines have no ability to recognize 
the characters embedded in each image. It follows that it is 
rather difficult for an automated program to find pass-images 
according to the recorded strings. 
The loophole in this scheme occurs if the adversary is a 
person and the spyware is an assistant. The password will be in 
danger because CAPTCHA is easy for a person. In this case, 
the person can see what the spyware has gathered, a successful 
login scene along with the entered characters. Then, a person 
can crack the passwords without much effort. For 26 lower 
case letters in the scheme, the probability that different images 
have the same string is 1/456976, which can be ignored. One 
useful method for password cracking is to divide the gathered 
strings with four characters into groups and then compare each 
segment with that below each image. To close this loophole, 
we constructed an improved version. 
 
(a) The interface of register. 
 
(b) A login screen of the same user ‘ghc’ in (a). 
Figure 2.  The interface of the basic scheme (The pass-images are circled).
B. The Imporved Scheme 
The vulnerability of the basic scheme lies in two factors. 
One is the requirement that CAPTCHAs should be human user 
friendly. The other is the reversible relationship between 
passwords and what is entered. That is, pass-images determine 
what is entered and vice versa. What’s more, we noted that the 
reversible relationship depends greatly on the fact that the 
probability of different images with the same adjunctive string 
is close to zero and that the trap of each pass-image has a 
uniform length. While the former is necessary for a popular 
authentication scheme, we are encouraged to disturb the latter. 
One possible method is increasing the probability by 
decreasing the types of letters or the length of adjunctive string. 
This method might work, but it will increase the probability of 
illegal login by random guessing. Thereby, it is ineffective as a 
security method. Our alternative is to replace the uniform 
length with a random one predefined by users. In other words, 
the number of characters entered is determined by users. 
In our improved scheme, users are required to select and 
remember letter positions, ie choose several specific letter 
positions within a string of letters; for example, letters in 1st, 4th 
and 5th position in the string will become the code. These letter 
positions are the called pass-positions for each pass-image. 
During the authentication, users should enter the characters 
shown in the pass-positions of each pass-image. An example is 
shown in Figure 2. 
In Figure 2(b), the three circled images are pass-images, the 
strings with them are ‘qarwrxex’, ‘heeqseio’, and ‘mvgqqebh’ 
respectively, and the corresponding pass-positions are  (1, 2, 4), 
(4, 6, 8), and (3, 5) shown in Figure 2 (a). A user can input any 
combination of the three sequences, ‘qaw’, ‘qeo’, and ‘gq’ to 
be authenticated successfully. 
This scheme is strongly resistant to attacks launched by 
humans with spyware, while simultaneously preserving the 
advantages of graphical password schemes. The related 
security analysis will be given in the following section and 
usability problems will be discussed in Section 5, 6 and 7 
through experiments. 
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE IMPROVED SCHEME 
A. Capability to Withstand Spyware 
There are many different kinds of spyware [1, 2], such as 
browser hijackers, keyloggers and spybots. We have focused 
on the spyware cluster that runs in the background collecting 
passwords. The security of our scheme relies on the robustness 
of CAPTCHA in resisting automatic adversarial attacks. 
However, it is not clear whether there is a true CAPTCHA at 
all and some reports show that some text-based CAPTCHAs 
can be partly or almost broken by automatic programs [3, 29, 
30]. With the assumption that spyware is capable of detecting 
and recording screen snapshots, entered strings and the system 
feedback, we will analyze the security of the improved scheme 
from two extreme aspects. Firstly, it is impossible for machines 
to solve the CAPTCHAs in our scheme, the ideal case. 
Secondly, CAPTCHAs can be completely solved by machines, 
the worst case. 
Under ideal conditions, spywares have no chance of gaining 
the passwords without human invention, similar to the 
discussion in sections 3.1. If people are involved, spyware 
assistance can help users to break the scheme. What the 
spyware needs to do is to catch the password string entered by 
the legal user. To crack passwords, adversaries should solve the 
CAPTCHA himself or by employing human workers. It is 
costly to obtain a password because the pass-positions of each 
pass-image are unknown and thereby it is hard to manually find 
the correspondence between pass-images and what is entered. 
Even for the lowest level security, adversaries must recognize 
400 CAPTCHAs. In this case, there are three pass-images, each 
with a pass-position and then the attacker can easily divide the 
entered string into three segments each with a specific 
character. The probability of a letter displayed below one 
image is 27.0
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  approximately from one 
observation and analysis. Through interaction, the attacker can 
gradually get rid of all the decoys. For the second observation, 
the number of decoys will be 7
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third observation, there will only be about three CAPTCHAs 
which contain the specific character. The attacker can find the 
users passwords correctly in four sessions. So the attacker must 
solve approximately 400 CAPTCHAs and conduct many 
observations and comparisons, which is time consuming and 
costly. More complex work is required if the correspondence 
between pass-images and entered strings are unknown. 
Therefore, our scheme has a strong resistance against spywares 
under the ideal environment. 
Projecting the worst condition, that CAPTCHAs can be 
completely solved by machines, it is possible that spywares 
could crack passwords because each successful login reveals 
some information about the password. One method is to divide 
the entered strings into different segments and find the 
passwords from images which contain the same segments from 
analyzing different login sessions. Another method is to find 
the common images by excluding images without any character 
of the entered string. For instance, when the passwords lie in 
the lowest security level, it is possible to crack the passwords in 
four sessions, as discussed above. 
This worst case scenario is not probable, unless spywares 
can gather sufficient information in the background and can 
break CAPTCHAs quickly. Currently, no programs can break a 
CAPTCHA automatically in a short time. Furthermore, even if 
the currently applied CAPTCHAs are effectively broken, there 
will always be versions with higher security in production. In 
addition, as long as the hard AI problems underlying 
CAPTCHA are unsolved, successful attacks will advance the 
development of more robust CAPTCHAs. 
Therefore, it is demonstrated that our scheme is secure 
against spyware as long as CAPTCHAs can not be broken by 
automated programs. Any defeated CAPTCHAs will be 
substituted by more robust ones. If humans are involved, the 
cost of cracking a password is significantly increased. 
B. The Size of the Password Space 
Now, we consider the raw size of the password space, 
assuming users are equally likely to pick any element as their 
password. According to the definition in [23], the raw size is an 
upper bound on the information content of the distribution that 
users choose in practice. 
We compute the size ),,( MNLS  of password space of 
total entered length equal to L when there are N images 
displayed and the length of CAPTCHAs is equal to M. In our 
scheme, for security reasons, the number of pass-images is 
required to be not less than 3. Thus, S is defined in terms 
of ),,,( MNLKP , the number of passwords with number of 
pass-images equal to K by: 
∑
=
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In turn, ),,,( MNLKP can be defined in terms 
of ),,,( MNLKO , the number of passwords when the K pass-
images have been confirmed, by: 
),,,(),,,( MNLKOCMNLKP KN ⋅=                     (2) 
The reason is that the K pass-images have no relative order. 
Assume the number of pass-positions for one pass-image is n, 
we can get, 
Lnnn K =+++ "21                                 (3) 
Here, the problem can be seen as an issue of the ordered 
partitions of positive integer. L is partitioned into K 
( LK ≤≤1 ) sections. According to the theorem of the partition 
of positive integer, the generating function of sequence of 
partition numbers is K
M
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Combining the formulae, we can compute the size of the 
password space. The results for the password space are given in 
Table 1, when N=50, M=8, and 103 ≤≤ L . 
Table 1 results are encouraging. however, that is the raw 
size of our password space. In practice, actual password space 
will be reduced due to users’ individual preferences. 
Additionally, the size of the password space of our scheme is 
actually smaller than that of text-based passwords (94 printable 
characters available) when the length is equal to or greater than 
10( 1910 104.594 ×≈ ). As we know, the exhaustive-search 
attack is always produced automatically by software rather than 
by people. In our scheme, CAPTCHA is introduced to resist 
this kind of attack. Subsequent CAPTCHA development 
maintains the security of our method, as each round of 
development becomes more difficult for automated cracking 
programs and more expensive for manual, human-based 
cracking programs. 
TABLE I.  NUMBER OF PASSWORDS OF ENTERED LENGTH EQUAL TO L 
(N=50 AND M=8). 
L Password space size log2(#space size) 
3 
7100.1 ×  23.3 
4 
9100.1 ×  30.0 
5 
10103.8 ×  36.3 
6 
12105.5 ×  42.3 
7 
14101.3 ×  48.1 
8 
16105.1 ×  53.8 
9 
17106.6 ×  59.2 
10 
19106.2 ×  64.5 
 
C. Brute Force Attacks 
Brute force attack, trying to randomly guess the correct 
passwords, is the simplest form of attack for an authentication 
scheme. For our scheme, with a candidate set of A characters, 
the probability that a single random guess succeeds is LAK! . 
For one legitimate user, every time to authenticate, there 
are !K  choices of entered string, since pass-images have no 
relative order. Just as the instance shown in Session 3.2, the 
user can enter any combination of three sequences to 
authenticate. Thus, there are six possible strings to enter, 
‘qawqeogq’, ‘qawgqqeo’, ‘qeoqawgq’, ‘qeogqqaw’, 
‘gqqawqeo’, ‘gqqeoqaw’. For )4,8,26(),,( =KLA , we 
obtain 78 26126!4 ≈ . The attacker has a very low probability 
of logging on successfully with a brute force attack. 
V. EXPERIMENTAL MENTHODOLOGY 
During the testing phase, fifty images of 60×60 pixels and 
corresponding CAPTCHAs were displayed on the screen in the 
prototype of the improved scheme. All the images were 
downloaded from http://www.chinaz.com freeware website and 
processed for study only. The length of CAPTCHA strings was 
8, and the characters contained 26 lowercase letters. The 
CAPTCHA algorithm was designed to generate crowded, 
distorted and rugged strings similar to the CAPTCHA being 
used in Google email service for its acknowledged robustness. 
A total of 36 participants were invited to complete the 
experiments and answer some questions. The participants, of 
whom there were 15 women and 21 men, were staff and 
students from a university community and unfamiliar with our 
scheme. The average age of the participants was 27 years 
(StdDev=4.5), and ranged from 21 to 39 years. All the 
participants were required to complete the following operations 
individually. 
Firstly, they need answer a demographic questionnaire, 
which collected information including age, sex, highest degree 
earned and computer experience. At this session the scheme 
and procedures for the experiments were explained to them in 
detail. 
Secondly, the user was required to select three or more 
pass-images. After selecting the pass-images, the user set the 
pass-positions for each image. During the testing phase, if the 
participants forgot the pass-images or the pass-positions, the 
password which they have just set was shown to them. 
In the testing phase, the data were collected longitudinally: 
first, at end of the training session (P1), then one week later 
(P2), and finally one month later (P3). For P1, each participant 
was asked to set a password, and authenticate ten times. For P2 
and P3, if a participant entered an incorrect password, he or she 
was allowed to re-enter the password. Three login attempts 
were permitted for each participant. 
VI. RESULTS 
A. The Mean Success Login Percentage 
In P1 testing session, 9 of 36 participants completed with 
no mistakes in ten times of login, while the others, to a greater 
or less extent, made some incorrect submissions. The mean 
success login percentage is 87.8% (StdDev=9.29). The reasons 
offered by the participants for the incorrect submissions 
included difficulty in identifying the text-based CAPTCHAs 
generated by our algorithms and sometimes in locating the 
exact pass-positions. 
B. The Mean Login Time 
In P1 testing session, the mean login time of all participants 
is 22.04 seconds (StdDev=10.9) which is acceptable for most 
participants. The results show that there is a significant 
difference in terms of time to respond to a challenge (F 
(35,280) =15.48, p<0.01). The main reason may be that the 
CAPTCHAs are randomly generated so that sometimes they 
are easy to recognize but sometimes more difficult. As the 
images are randomly located, the time for recognition also 
differs. Results show that the majority of participants chose 
three to five pass-images, with only three participants choosing 
more than five pass-images. Mean times and standard 
deviations of logins with different pass-images are shown in 
Table 2. 
C. Password Memorability 
In P2 testing session, 80.6 percent of participants 
successfully logged into his/her account in three attempts, and 
in P3 session, 72.2 percent participants were successful. 
Interviews with participants provided the following reasons for 
memory lapses: a) the difficulty of remembering the pass-
positions and b) the difficulty of remembering the relationships 
between pass-positions and pass-images. 
 
TABLE II.  MEAN TIMES (SECONDS) AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF 
CHALLENGES WITH DIFFERENT PASS-IMAGES 
Numbers of 
pass-images 
Numbers of 
persons Mean StdDev 
3 18 17.57 7.7 
4 12 24.76 6.7 
5 3 44.00 16.8 
6 1 25.87 4.5 
7 1 16.87 3.6 
9 1 15.37 5.4 
 
VII. DISCUSSION 
In comparison to other graphical password schemes, such 
as [7,14,26], there are some advantages and disadvantages in 
our improved scheme. One disadvantage is that it is more 
complex and increases users’ memory load. Users have to 
remember both the pass-images and pass-positions. To be 
authenticated, users need to recognize the pass-images and 
input the characters of the text-based CAPTCHAs on the pass-
positions correctly. These factors have increased the 
complexity of the login process. However, although it is 
complex and cumbersome, the improved scheme is strongly 
resistant to spywares, which is our primary focus. 
A comparison of login time for our scheme shows that, our 
scheme, as other graphical schemes, is longer than that of text-
based schemes. However, when compared to other graphical 
password schemes our login time is shorter.  For instance, the 
mean login time of CHC is 72 seconds and Déjà vu is 27 to 32 
seconds because there are multiple rounds of challenges in 
these schemes [26]. In [18], a typical entry takes over 3 
minutes using a high-complexity protocol and over 1.5 minutes 
with a low-complexity protocol. Moreover, schemes against 
spywares [18, 20] also challenge user’s memory capacity to a 
great extent. In [18], the high-complexity protocol asks the user 
to remember 30 pictures. And in [20], the user needs to 
remember 16 random strings for corresponding 16 pass-
images. The mean login time of our improved scheme is 22.04 
seconds. We believe that our login times will decrease with 
familiarity with the scheme. All experiments were undertaken 
in lab and all the participants were new to our scheme. The 
users’ login speed should be faster with the extended use. 
If the scheme is moved to real usage, the settings of the 
parameters can be adjusted to adapt to different security 
demands and application situations. There are M images 
randomly generated including N pass-images, and there are S 
rounds of challenges for one login. For each round, m images 
are displayed with n pass-images. With the increasing of the 
numbers of total images, pass-images and length of text-based 
CATPCHAs, the security of the scheme will be enhanced. For 
example, when M = 250 and N = 10, the spyware will detect 10 
pass-images and the corresponding pass-positions for 250 
images. This requires recording of hundreds of logins and 
recognition of a huge number of CAPTHCAs. Gathering so 
much information may take a long time and recognizing the 
CAPTCHAs also needs an extensive manpower. Certainly, 
increasing the setting for high security is at the expense of 
usability. 
There are also some user behaviors which create risks for 
our scheme. First, the passwords selected by user often accord 
with a particular trend. For example, in order to make the 
password easily remembered, most users select the same 
position for different pass-images, first or anterior positions, 
consecutive positions or one position for each pass-image. And 
certain images were selected by a number of users as pass-
images. All the factors mentioned above can reduce the 
practical password space and increase the possibility of 
“guessing” attacks. 
Second, we find that there is always a significant time gap 
when entering characters belonging to two different pass-
images. The reason is that users are used to enter corresponding 
characters after he finds a pass-image. Such a situation will be 
recorded and utilized by spywares. This problem can be solved 
by entering characters by turns which belong to different 
CATPCHAs in a certain order. 
In summary, our improved scheme is resistant to spyware 
attack, and the rules for setting passwords have increased the 
cost and time of the human intervention attack. 
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS 
In this paper, we have presented a new approach to protect 
user’s password against spyware attack. Our main contribution 
is that we introduce CAPTCHA into the realm of graphical 
passwords to resist spyware programs. From a security 
viewpoint, this exploration is expected to advance the 
development of graphical passwords. While the design of 
CAPTCHA is an interdisciplinary topic and the current 
collective understanding of this topic is still in its infancy, we 
do not claim that our scheme is immediately feasible.  
However, we believe that our method will enhance current 
security and as CAPTCHA increases in effectiveness our 
method will also increase computer security. 
The results of our experiments show that the future research 
should concentrate on improving the login time and 
memorability. Furthermore, when a user inputs the 
corresponding substrings which belong to different 
CAPTCHAs, the time gap is longer than the time between two 
characters in one substring. So a method for narrowing the time 
gap in the entering process and reduction of the impact of 
user’s choice trend on security, provide other areas for future 
research. 
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